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  1 
Spatial Aggregation and Weather Risk Management 
 
Abstract 
Previous studies identify limited potential efficacy of weather derivatives in hedging 
agricultural exposures.  In contrast to earlier studies which investigate the problem at 
low levels of aggregation, we find using straight forward temperature contracts that 
better weather hedging opportunities exist at higher levels of spatial aggregation.  
Aggregating production exposures reduces idiosyncratic (i.e. localized or region 
specific) risk, leaving a greater proportion of the total risk in the form of systemic 
weather risk which can be effectively hedged using weather derivatives.  The aggregation 
effect suggests that the potential for weather derivatives in agriculture may be greater 
than previously thought, particularly for aggregators of risk such as re/insurers.   
 
 
























The failures of crop insurance markets in the form of high loss ratios, low participation 
rates, and the aversion of private insurance companies to bearing exposures have been 
documented extensively.  Early explanations attributed these failures primarily to 
information asymmetries related to moral hazard and adverse selection (Chambers 1989; 
Skees and Reed 1986; Nelson and Loehman 1987; Goodwin and Smith 1995; Gardner 
1994; Just and Calvin 1994; Quiggen 1994; Quiggen, Karagiannis and Stanton 1994).
1  
More recently, a different view has gained support that relates market failures to the 
inherent systemic nature of the risks in insuring agricultural production (Miranda and 
Glauber 1997; Duncan and Meyers 2000; and Mason, Hayes and Lence 2003).   
Systemic risk in agricultural insurance markets stems from spatially correlated 
adverse weather events.  Research on this explanation concentrates primarily on 
identifying the nature and magnitude of systemic risks (Mason, Hayes and Lence 2003; 
Miranda and Glauber 1997) and on investigating ways in which the risks can be managed 
utilizing private reinsurance and capital markets (Hayes, Lence and Mason 2004; Turvey, 
Nayak and Sparling 1999; Miranda and Glauber 1997).  To date, no empirical 
investigation of reinsurance hedging with weather derivatives (WDs) has been conducted   
A key characteristic of agriculture is that it is extremely weather sensitive, and the 
use of WDs in agriculture has received increased attention recently.  Currently, the WD 
market is the fastest growing derivative market in the world (Brockett, Wang and Yang 
2005).  According to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) the value of CME 
Weather products grew nine fold in the first nine months of 2005, growing from $2.2 
  3billion in 2004 to $22 billion through September 2005, with trading volume surpassing 
630,000 contracts.  While numerous authors have suggested the potential of weather 
hedging in a reinsurance context on conceptual grounds (Glauber 2004; Skees and 
Barnett 1999), earlier research suggests that the potential effectiveness of WDs at the 
farm level may be limited (Vedenov and Barnett 2004).  Evaluation at low levels of 
aggregation, however, may not be relevant for re/insurers who are exposed to more 
aggregated risks, but no clear explanation has been offered to clarify why one might 
expect improved WD hedging performance at the re/insurance (i.e. aggregate) versus the 
primary (i.e. farm) level.   
This study attempts to bridge these gaps in the literature by proposing that WD 
hedging may be more effective at higher levels of aggregation.  Specifically, aggregating 
production exposures across space may reduce idiosyncratic (i.e. localized or region 
specific) risk in the aggregate portfolio.  A greater proportion of the aggregate portfolio’s 
total risk may be left in the form of systemic weather risk relative to idiosyncratic risk, 
which may be effectively hedged using WDs.  A conceptual model that supports this 
notion is developed.  The hypothesis is investigated at varying levels of aggregation using 
Illinois corn during 1971-2002 at the CRD and state level.   
The hedging analysis assumes minimization of semi-variance. The expected-
shortfall measure of tail-risk is also evaluated.  These measures of downside risk are 
more relevant to re/insurers, as they are typically more concerned with loss events.  The 
hedging analysis focuses on seasonal temperature derivatives in lieu of more complex 
monthly precipitation and temperature derivatives used in previous studies for several 
reasons.  The interaction of temperature and precipitation during loss events, temperature 
  4autocorrelations, and high computation costs limit the potential benefits of more complex 
WDs.  Also, transaction costs associated with negotiating over-the-counter (OTC) 
precipitation derivatives are likely high, and their potential for liquidity low, relative to 
temperature derivatives.  Further, the markets for the temperature derivatives traded at the 
CME are currently the most developed WD markets.  The WDs employed here, which 
are highly consistent with the CME contracts in structure, thus appear to present a 
promising avenue for current research.   
 
Weather Risk in Crop Insurance Markets 
In contrast to earlier studies on failures in crop insurance markets, Miranda and Glauber 
(1997; hereafter MG) propose that systemic weather risk poses a serious obstacle to the 
emergence of independent private crop insurance markets because widespread adverse 
weather induces significant correlations among individual farm-level yields.  MG 
estimate that US crop insurer portfolios are between twenty to fifty times riskier than they 
otherwise would be if yields were independent.  Thus, the lack of independence among 
individual yields causes crop insurers to bear substantially higher risk per unit of 
premium than other property liability and business insurers.   
In order to induce insurers to underwrite crop insurance, insurers in the United 
States are provided reinsurance protection by the government under the Standard 
Reinsurance Agreement (SRA).   The SRA imposes large administrative costs on the 
public.  Further, the extent to which the SRA effectively transfers systemic risks from the 
insurer to the government is not known.  Ineffective transfer of systemic risk under the 
SRA may impose additional costs on the government if insurers do not have the 
  5incentives to appropriately monitor the policies they underwrite.  Also, the current 
structure of the SRA is restrictive in terms of how insurers may price the policies they 
underwrite.  All of these factors contribute to excess costs, whether implicit or explicit, 
generated by the absence of competitive and independent agricultural insurance markets.   
MG suggest that area yield reinsurance contracts may permit crop insurers to 
cover most of their systemic crop loss risk, reducing their risk exposure to levels typically 
experienced by conventional property liability insurers.
2  Given the ability to hedge their 
systemic risk, crop insurers may be less averse to insuring crop production independently, 
lessening the need for government intervention and increasing the efficient functioning of 
agricultural insurance markets. 
Hayes, Lence and Mason (2004),
 3 as well as MG (1997), investigate the 
effectiveness of area yield derivatives in hedging crop insurance risk.  Although area 
yield contracts did trade for a short time in an exchange setting, they eventually failed 
due to insufficient trading volume.  A major problem was that market-makers were 
largely uninterested in taking the other side of such specialized contracts because they 
were unable to offset the resulting risk.  This does not appear to be the case for weather 
derivatives.  The potential for liquidity in WD markets is greater due to the number of 
market agents with naturally opposing hedge preferences (e.g., electrical utilities).   
Hayes, Lence and Mason (2004) also investigate the hedging effectiveness of 
price derivatives.  The primary risk factor in crop insurance, however, is not price but 
rather widespread adverse weather events such as drought and extreme temperatures 
during critical growing periods.  In addition, plant disease and infection can be intensified 
by adverse weather.   
  6While researchers have suggested that WDs may be useful for hedging systemic 
risk, the use of WDs by producers is questionable.  For example, Vedenov and Barnett 
(2004; hereafter VB) analyze the efficiency of WDs as primary hedging instruments for 
corn, soybeans, and cotton in the U.S. at the CRD level of aggregation.  Based on 
relatively complex non-linear combinations of monthly (June, July, and August) 
precipitation and temperature indexes, VB’s results suggest only the limited efficacy of 
WDs in hedging disaggregated production exposures.
4   
This study builds on earlier research in two important dimensions.  First, hedging 
effectiveness of WDs are investigated at varying levels of spatial aggregation (i.e., the 
state and CRD level).  Yields evaluated at low levels of aggregation (e.g., farm or CRD 
level) are likely much riskier than those at higher levels (e.g., state level) because the 
potential degree to which idiosyncratic risks self-diversify increases as the level of 
aggregation increases.  Yet, high temperature spatial correlations induce significant 
correlations among low-level yield exposures.  Thus, relatively more risk may be left in 
the form of systemic weather risk and the hedging effectiveness of WDs may increase as 
the level of aggregation is increased.  Analysis of aggregated yields may also be more 
relevant from the re/insurers viewpoint as aggregate yield risk more accurately embodies 
their systemic risk.  
Second, we investigate straight forward seasonal temperature WDs in lieu of 
complex monthly temperature and precipitation WDs.  Persistence in weather conditions 
may induce a high degree of collinearity among precipitation and temperature (Namias 
1986).  This, along with the fact that weather conditions in the U.S. during the summer 
tend to be autocorrelated (Jewson and Brix 2005), increases the probability of 
  7misspecifying weather hedges that involve multiple underlying indexes.  The current 
work simplifies the analysis by investigating seasonal (June, July, and August) 
temperature WDs.   
 
Conceptual Model 
Idiosyncratic effects may self-diversify when aggregated, leaving a greater proportion of 
the total risk in the form of weather risk.  Thus, WD hedging may be more effective for 
aggregate rather than disaggregate yield exposures.  The magnitude of the spatial 
aggregation effect depends on the relative correlations of weather and idiosyncratic yield 
effects across locations.  To illustrate, assume yields can be decomposed into two effects, 
weather effects,W, and all other effects,ε , which may be correlated.  Consider a simple 
model of crop yields which allows for non-linear terms  
(1)                                                 ,, () tk k k tk tk Yf , α ε = ++ W       
where t is the time index, k is the location index,  is a vector of weather variables, 
 represents the systemic weather component of yields, 
, tk W
, ( kt k f W ) , tk ε  represents the 
idiosyncratic risk component, and  , [] 0 tk E ε = .  Summing across k locations, gives 
(2)                                    ,, [] [ ( ) ] [ tk k k tk tk
kk k k
EY E f E , ] α ε =+ + ∑∑ ∑ ∑ W  
and 
(3)                  ,, ,, [ ] [( ) ][ ] [( ) , tk k tk tk k tk tk
kk kk k
Var Y Var f Var Cov f , ] ε ε =+ + ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑ WW .  
If the  , ' tk s ε  are relatively less positively correlated than the  , () ' kt k f s W  across locations 
then, as the individual yields are summed, more variation in yields may be able to be 
attributed to the weather effects at larger levels of spatial aggregation.  Thus, WD 
  8hedging may be more effective at larger levels of spatial aggregation.  
To illustrate consider an extreme case.  Suppose there are two locations and that 
the  tk , 's ε  are perfectly negatively correlated,  , () ' kt k f s W  are perfectly positively 
correlated, and [( ) , ]0 , kt k t j Cov f j k ,, ε = ∀ W .  In this case the variance of aggregate 
yields reduces t
(4)                        
o 
                    ) ]   ,, [][ ( tk k tk
kk
Var Y Var f = ∑ ∑ W ,     
and all variation in yields can be attributed to weather events.  This risk can be potentially 
e 
y not be useful for individual 
tors of 
y not always be the case.  At the other extreme, consider two 
location
hedged with a WD equal in size but opposite in direction to the underlying systemic 
weather effect,  , () kt k f W .  This situation is depicted in Figure 1.  If W  can be 
approximated by erature index the risk of the aggregated expo re can b
effectively hedged with a call option on the index W with strike price K*.  This 
framework supports the notion that while WDs ma
producers they may still prove useful in hedging systemic risks borne by aggrega
risk such as re/insurers.   
Of course, this ma
 a temp su
s where the  , ' tk s ε  are perfectly positively correlated, the  , () ' kt k f s W  are perfect
negatively correlated ,, [( ) , ]0 , kt k t j Cov f j k
ly 
, and ε = ∀ W .  In this  riance of 
aggregate yields reduces to
(5)                                         
case the va
 
  ]   ,, [][ tk tk
kk
Var Y Var ε = ∑ ∑ ,       
While both cases are unrealistic they illustrate the main point of the aggregation 
all variation in aggregate yields is attributed to idiosyncratic effects and none of the 
aggregate risk can be hedged using WDs. 
  9argument.  If weather events across locations are highly correlated, but other yield effects 
are rela
e 
ields should have a diversifying 
effect a
 
Failure to account for technological advancements in crop production can produce 
rical yields may produce spurious 
ed as 
tively less correlated, then relatively more variation (i.e. risk) in yields can be 
attributed to weather events as yields are aggregated.  Empirically, the relevant question 
for the re/insurer is whether the differences in the correlations of weather effects and 
other yield effects are significant enough to see substantial differences in WD hedging 
effectiveness as the level of aggregation increases.   
There are good reasons to believe that WD hedging may be more effective as th
level of aggregation is increased.  First, aggregating y
cross locations.  Popp, Rudstrom and Manning (2005), for instance, find that the 
risk of farm-level yields is substantially higher than county-level yields.  This is partly 
due to the diversifying effect as yields are aggregated over individual farms.
5  Second, 
weather events tend to be highly spatially correlated.
6 For example, the average 
correlation between the temperature indexes used in this study (the temperature indexes
are described in section 5) across locations was 0.755.
7   
 
Yields, Weather Indexes, Derivatives, and Pricing 
misleading hedging results.  Significant trends in histo
hedge ratios which are not representative of the underlying optimal hedge ratio 
distribution.  To account for changes in technology district level yields are detrended 
using a simple log-linear trend model (VB 2004)
8
(6)                       2002 ,..., 1972 , 1971 ), 1971 ( ) log( 1 0 = − + = t t Y
tr
t α α .    
Detrended yields to 2002 equivalents are calculat
  10(7)                                    2002 ,..., 1971 ,







t t      
where  are observed yields and  are the corresponding yield trends. 
The negative effect of temperature stress on corn yields during the summer season 









is well accepted (see, e.g., Monjard o, Smith and Jones 2005; Dixon et a
nd Kaufmann and Snell 1997).  Furthermore, temperature derivatives are likely 
the most feasible weather variable on which to structure weather contracts from a 
transaction cost standpoint.  Thus temperature derivatives are adopted for this study.  Th
temperature variables used are Accumulated Cooling Degree Days (ACDD’s) for t
summer season: June, July, and August.  Agronomic experiments indicate that cooling 
degree days (CDD’s) are more relevant to crop yields than outright temperature 
measurements (Schlenker, Hanemann and Fisher 2006).  Further, the temperature 
derivatives traded on the CME are written on ACDD indexes.  The number of CD
a single day is defined as the amount by which the average temperature is above th
reference temperature, sixty-five degrees Fahrenheit.  Explicitly, the number of CDD’s 
on any day t is given by 
(8)                                              ) 65 , 0 ( − = t t T Max CDD       
where  t T  is the average temperature on day t.  The average temperature is the simple 
aximum and minimum
N M t
arithmetic average of the daily m  temperatures.  The index of 
ACDD’s on any date, t, is simply defined as 




t CDD ACDD ,
,      M N M t ,..., − =      
− =
where   is the first day of the contract period and  N M − M  is the expiration date. 
  11Although precipitation is also an important ri yields, we restrict  sk factor in crop 
analysis to temperature derivatives due to the higher potential for liquidity in temperature 
derivat e 







s are systemically related to summer ACDD’s, 
there is
derivatives.  For instance, from October 14, 1997 to April 15, 2001, temperature 
ives represented over 98% of all WDs (Brockett, Wang and Yang 2005).    The us
of temperature derivatives may not be a major shortcoming as atmospheric flow patterns 
that control much of the North American climate tend to be persistent (Namias 19
particular, during extreme drought events—those most likely to result in widespread crop 
losses—this persistence phenomenon causes heat and precipitation conditions to interact 
causing a self-perpetuating event.  On a large scale, average temperature and precipitation 
conditions for a given region are likely highly negatively correlated in extreme events.  
Figure 2 displays aggregate detrended Illinois state corn yields for 1971-2002, 
with the x-axis ordered by summer season ACDD’s.  The hottest years, those in which 
ACDD’s exceeded approximately 900, corresponded roughly to the driest years. In fact,
the five hottest years were also drought years.  Furthermore, all droughts 
corresponded to temperatures in excess of 900 ACDD’s.  Thus, it appears that 
temperature derivatives may act as a suitable substitute in hedging precipitation risk when
it is most needed.  The use of an accumulated index is further motivated by the fa
in the U.S. corn growing regions, month-to-month temperatures are typically 
autocorrelated (Jewson and Brix 2005).   
Hedging yield risk with WDs becomes a difficult problem for two reasons.  First,
there is a high degree of yield variability that cannot be attributed to potentiall
weather indexes.  For instance, while yield
 still considerable yield variability that cannot be ascribed to ACDD’s.  For 
  12example, large yield shortfalls may be due to other events not related to ACDD’s, such as 
in 1974 when late planting and an early season-ending frost were responsible for lar
yield shortfalls (Figure 2).  Second, the relationship between weather and yields is likely 
non-linear.  In Figure 2 a trend line is obtained by plotting the fitted values from 
regressing yields on ACCD’s for the highest (above 900) and lowest (below 900) 
observed ACCD’s separately.  For Illinois corn, it appears that yields are non-linearly
related to ACDD’s, suggesting the potential advantage in hedging applications of a
options contract which can be non-linearly related to an ACCD index.  In the analysis w
include swaps as well as options in order to investigate the degree to which non-linea
weather effects exist in yields.   
All derivatives are priced using burn analysis (BA).  BA is the simplest method 






nd is based on calculating what the contract would have 
paid ou
         )
t in the past based on observed historical distributions.
9 It is attractive in that it 
does not require strong assumptions about the distribution of the underlying index, and it 
is simple to compute.
10   
The pay-off, f, from a long swap contract is given by 
(10)                                     () ( f ACDD D ACDD K = −     
where A CCD, and K is the strike 
tract pays $D per ACCD ab
.  If 
e 
CDD is the index, D is the tick value measured in $/A
price of the contract (i.e. the con ove the chosen strike price 
K).  The pay-off is a linear function of the index.  The buyer is swapping a certain 
exposure, K, to the index for an uncertain exposure, ACDD, and thus the name swap.  
Most swaps are costless (i.e. there is no premium, and the pay-off equals the profit)
the swap contract is to be traded without a premium then the strike must be set at a valu
  13such that the expected pay-off is zero, that is KF = E(ACDD), where  KF is known as the
“fair strike”.  Pricing of a swap thus entails determining the fair strike.  Pricing a zero-
cost linear swap using BA simply involves setting the fair strike equal to the historical 
average of the index.
 
  ) )
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The pay-off, p, from a long call option is given by  
(11)                                  (, )( 0 , ( pA C D DK M a x DA C D D K = −       
and the
ACDD K Max D ACDD K
 profit, π, is given by 
(12)                              ( ) P K (, )( 0 , ( ) ) π = −−    
r premium.  For options, pricing entails simply determining 
ir price which is defined so that the expected pr
 and Risk Measures 
ollowing VB, the hedge ratio is determined by minimizing the semi-variance (SV) of a 
 SV only measures deviations below the mean 
  
where P is the option price, o
the fair premium, or fa ofit on the contract 
is zero.  The fair price is equal to the expected pay-off of the contract, or P = E(p), and 
pricing using BA simply consists of calculating the mean of the historical pay-offs, p, 




portfolio consisting of yields and a WD. 
and thus is a measure of downside risk.  Formally, for swaps the weight, or hedge ratio 
(contracts/acre), w, is chosen by solving   
(13)                                
det 2




where w is the hedge ratio measured in contracts/acre,   is detrended yield in bu/acre, 
det
, tk Y
k Y  is the long-run average detrended yield, and  , tk f  is the return on the swap contract 
  14which pays $1 per ACDD.  The tick is normalized to $1 for simplicity.  For options, the 
v, and strike price, K, are chosen by solving 
(14)                




, , min max{ [ ( )],0}
kk
kt kk k k wK
t
YY v K π −+ ∑   
where  () k K π  is the profit of an ACDD call option with strike price K. 
The hedging effectiveness of weather derivatives is evaluated by comparing 
portfolios with and without derivatives and at different levels of aggregation using a 
simple historical simulation.  Hedging effectiveness is evaluated using hypothetical 
ACDD derivatives written for the locations in Table 1.
The criterion used to evaluate the change in risk exposure is the root mean square 
loss (RMSL).  RMSL is a simple function of SV 






− =       
_
2
                                         
where T=32 is the sample size, and   is the SV from equations (13) and (14).   
t losses, insurers may
magnitude of losses given an extreme event occurs.  Thus, expected shortfall (ES) is also 
reported (Dowd and Blake 2006).  ES is the probability weighted average of the worst 
k σ
In addition to expected ne  also be interested in the 
13
α  revenues.  In the case of a discrete distribution, the ES is given by 
(16)           
0
1
(pth worst outcome) (probability of pth worst outcome)
p
ESα α =
=× ∑     
d is reported for 
α
 
an α = 6%, 9%.  The ES measurements are calculated using a historical 
here each observation is assigned an equal probability of 1/T  (T=3 Thus,
ES 6% equals the average of the two lowest valued observations, and ES 9% equals the 
average of the three lowest observations. It can be interpreted as an expectation of yields 
simulation w 2).    
  15in the case that a tail event does occur, and thus is a preference free measure of tail-risk.
14 
The expected shortfall measure is used rather than the Value-at-Risk (VaR), which 
provides an estimate of the worst loss that one might expect given a tail event does not 
occur, because it is subadditive making it less likely to produce puzzling and inconsistent 
findings in hedging applications (Dowd and Blake 2006).   
 
Data 
The data used are Illinois CRD corn yields for 1971-2002.  Illinois consists of nine 
RD’s.  Temperature data were collected for a location within each CRD.  An attempt 
ade to select the most centralized location in each district (Table 1).  Yield data 
r data 
of 
s 2 and 3.  All estimates are obtained 
y minimizing SV as outlined above assuming a constant price of $2.50/bu.
16  Results are 
ple (Table 2), and then for the 2
nd half (Table 3) sub-sample 
C
was m
were obtained from the National Agricultural Statistics Service website, and weathe
from United States Historical Climatology Network (USHCN) website.  The state level 
(i.e. aggregated) yield and ACDD index measures were calculated as a simple average 
the individual district yields and ACDD indexes.
15
 
Results and Discussion 
The results of the hedging analysis appear in Table
b
presented for the full-sam
period which provides an out-of-sample dimension to the analysis.  Out-of-sample 
estimates in Table 3 are obtained by applying the in-sample solution for the 1
st half of the 
sample to the 2
nd half of the sample.  
  16Within the tables, the “Average of Districts” column statistics are calculated as 
the average of the individual district statistics, and are presented as a basis of comparison 
to the “
 
resulting from the addition of a WD is 
negativ S a 
r 
on pricing.  
Hedgin
t low 
 crop yields. 
State (aggregated)” portfolio statistics which are obtained by averaging the data 
across districts (i.e. aggregating) and then performing the analysis.  Notice, if the weather 
effects captured by an ACCD index across districts are relatively uncorrelated and/or the
other factors affecting yields are strongly correlated then the “State (Aggregated)” results 
will closely mirror the “Average of Districts” results.  Thus, substantial differences in the 
risk-reducing effectiveness of WDs for the “State (Aggregated)” portfolio compared to 
the “Average of Districts” portfolio indicates that the risk reduction offered by WDs at 
the aggregate level is stronger than what would be implied by evaluating the hedging 
effectiveness of the individual districts separately. 
Statistics measuring changes in RMSL and ES are calculated relative to the 
unhedged yield exposures.  If the change in RMSL 
e (positive) then the WD is risk-reducing (risk-enhancing), whereas for the E
positive (negative) change implies risk-reduction (risk-enhancement).   
The results for the full sample are presented in Table 2.  The return is the same fo
all hedged and unhedged portfolios in-sample, a direct result of fair opti
g effectiveness varied widely across districts, with reductions in RMSL (change in 
ES 6%) ranging from 11.45% ($15.58) in the Southwest D80 (East Southeast D70) 
region when hedging with swaps, to 41.76% ($67.76) for Southeast D90  
(Southeast 90) when hedging with call options.  The large variability indicates that a
levels of aggregation there is a high degree of idiosyncratic risk present in
Hedging with options was consistently more effective than hedging with swaps 




r the full-sample (Table 2) show that the RMSL (ES 6% and 
9%) is  d 
mine 
 hedging will be more effective at larger levels of aggregation.  For this we 
must tu
d)” portfolio for the full sample, 




ns, which is illustrated in Figure 2, is consistent across risk measures.  For 
example, in Table 2 the “State (Aggregated)” portfolio reduction in RMSL (change in ES
6%) was 43.31% ($59.91) when hedging with options compared to 31.88% ($46.37
when hedging with swaps.   
Next, we turn attention to investigation of the spatial aggregation effect.  The 
unhedged portfolio results fo
(are) lower (higher) for the “State (Aggregated)” portfolio, $39.80 ($235.38 an
$255.18), than for the “Average of Districts” portfolio, $45.42 ($221.48 and $235.55).  
This result implies that yield risk “self diversifies” to some extent in the aggregate 
portfolio.   
The comparison of unhedged portfolios, however, does not allow us to deter
whether WD
rn attention to the hedged portfolios.  We restrict attention to portfolios hedged 
with options for the remainder of the discussion.  The results from the swap hedging 
analysis, however, lead to similar conclusions.   
All estimates of hedging effectiveness support the aggregation argument.  
Reduction in the RMSL for the “State (Aggregate
, was greater than for the average of the districts, 28.93%, an improvement
hedging effectiveness of approximately 50% over what is implied by separate evalu
of the individual districts on average.  The intuition behind this result is that the weath
effects are strongly correlated across the districts while the other effects are relatively less
correlated.  Thus, the aggregated exposure is highly systemic and a substantial portion of 
  18this can be effectively managed using WDs.  The ES measure leads to similar 
conclusions.  For instance, the full-sample results indicate an ES 6% increase of $59.91 
for the State portfolio, versus $46.57 for the averaged district portfolios.   
The hedging effectiveness results were also stronger for the “State (Aggregated)”
portfolio than for any of the individual districts.  For instance, Table 2 show
 











r proportion of the aggregated 
on in RMSL was greater for the State portfolio, 43.31%, than for any of the 
individual district portfolios, the next closest being 41.76% for D90.  Also, the hedgin
effectiveness for the individual districts varied widely across districts with reduction
RMSL ranging from 41.76% for D90 to 13.81% for D80. 
The out-of-sample results lead to similar conclusions.
17  The out-of-sample 
estimates for the 2
nd half (Table 3) of the sample period sh
 for the State portfolio, versus 16.85% for the averaged district portfolios.  T
change in ES as well as the level of ES was greater for the State portfolio in all out-of-
sample cases.  For instance, Table 3 shows that the ES 6% (9%) was $291.85 ($296.17)
for the State portfolio versus $268.41 ($279.99) for the averaged district portfolios.  On
average, the hedging effectiveness for the out-of-sample results in this study, which 
employs simple seasonal temperature contracts, are comparable to those obtained by 
VB’s (2004) analysis which employs complex combinations of monthly precipitation
temperature derivatives.  This suggests that although substantial amounts of yield risk
be hedged using WDs, the marginal risk of overfitting weather hedges increases 
substantially as more complex instruments are employed. 
The findings suggest that aggregating individual production exposures ha
effect of reducing idiosyncratic yield risk, leaving a greate
  19portfoli  
he study investigates whether WDs are more effective for hedging yield exposures at 






reinsurance versus the primary 
level, s
os total risk in the form of systemic weather risk, a substantial portion of which
can be effectively hedged using WDs.  These results support the notion that WDs may be 
more useful than previously thought, particularly for aggregators of risk such as 
re/insurers.  In addition, the results show that the use of relatively simple temperature 





important dimensions.  We establish a simpler but clearer link between yields and 
temperature indexes and highlight how market agents may employ relatively simple WD
to hedge yield risk.  Also, we establish a link between temperatures and yields at a 
level of aggregation than previous studies.   The high performance of the temperature 
contracts in hedging systemic risk is related to three factors: the autocorrelations in 
month-to-month temperatures (Namias 1986; Jewson and Brix 2005), the highly negat
correlations between temperature and precipitation in extreme events (Namias 1986)
the non-linear response of yields to temperatures (VB 2004; Dixon et al 1994) which 
emerges most noticeably at higher levels of aggregation. 
The study provides two contributions.  First, a conceptual basis is established f
the notion that WD hedging may be more effective at the 
uggesting the potential of WDs for re/insurers.  Second, the empirical evidence 
substantiates the presence of the aggregation effect which supports the proposition that 
WDs, although likely not useful for individual producers, may provide benefits for 
  20aggregators of risk such as re/insurers.  Further, the use of simple temperature derivative
may provide risk management benefits which are reasonably effective and also more
consistent than those provided by complex multivariate WDs.  Given the problems that 
systemic weather risk has caused in crop insurance markets and also considering that 
crop insurance is now widespread with more than 75% of corn and soybeans planted in 
2003 insured (Coble et al 2004), our findings may be of interest to market-makers, 
re/insurers, and policy makers.  In addition, the aggregation effect outlined here may also
be applicable to other domains such as natural gas consumption. 
Several qualifications are in order.  First, this study only considers WDs written 
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ted with negotiating WDs in the OTC market on remote weather stations would 
entail high transaction costs and render these contracts infeasible.  However, WDs wr
on ACDD indexes for major international cities trade on the CME.  Given the great 
potential liquidity for these CME contracts and the high degree of spatial correlation in 
temperatures, an assessment of geographical basis risk for larger areas using CME 
contracts may be an interesting area of future research.   
This analysis does not consider actual re/insurer portfolios, but rather only 
establishes the basis for the spatial aggregation effect in y
ng WDs.  It is likely, however, that yield risk is a reasonable proxy for re/in
risk.  For instance, Hayes, Lence and Mason (2004) find that the RMA’s reinsurance
stems mostly from yield, or quantity, risk.  Still, future research of WD hedging with 
special attention to specification of the re/insurer portfolio is needed.  This may also 
include addressing price risk, which is not considered here.  Given the growing 
  21popularity of revenue products and the interaction between prices and yields at the 
aggregate level, optimal hedging of the re/insurer portfolio may involve simultan
determination of optimal hedge ratios with both price and weather derivatives.   
eous 
  22Footnotes 
1 Other explanations for low producer participation include crowding-out by other risk 
management tools and government programs (Wright and Hewitt 1994; and Schmitz, Just 
and Furtan 1994), heterogeneity in the financial conditions of farms (Leathers 1994), and 
the whole farm portfolio diversification effect (Schoney, Taylor and Hayward 1994). 
2 Most insurance markets have some degree of systemic risk.  For example, life insurance 
may be sensitive to interest rates, and health insurance markets may be sensitive to health 
care cost inflation.  Agricultural insurance markets, however, are unique in that the 
degree of systemic risk is so high that private markets have failed to develop without 
extreme government intervention. 
3 Hayes et al investigate reinsurance hedging for the Risk Management Agency (RMA), 
the government agency which administers the federal crop insurance program.  Although 
the RMA is technically a reinsurer, it is likely that the high degree of systemic risk in 
agricultural insurance markets exposes reinsures to the same fundamental problem faced 
by insurers in bearing systemic risk.  Because the exposure to systemic risk is similar, we 
don’t differentiate between hedging by the insurer and reinsurer in the discussion. 
4 VB (2004) investigate the hedging effectiveness of WDs at the CRD level and make the 
assumption that farmer level yield risk is accurately reflected in CRD level yield risk.  
They acknowledge, however, that typical farmer yields are likely much riskier than CRD 
yields. 
5 Preliminary analysis strongly suggested the presence of a self-diversifying aggregation 
effect.  The average correlation among individual district detrended yields was 0.746. 
  23Also, the data suggests that the variance of aggregate yields was significantly less than 
the variance of the individual yields. 
6 The disperse nature of rainfall in the summer months, which is frequently generated by 
spatially sporadic thunderstorms, contributes to the insurance portfolio’s ability to self-
diversify.  On aggregate however, rainfall and temperature tend to be highly correlated 
during drought events. 
7 In addition, preliminary analysis strongly supported the spatial aggregation hypothesis.  
Preliminary analysis was conducted by regressing individual district detrended yields on 
the temperature and temperature-squared indexes for all districts.  The average of the 
district adjusted R-squares was 0.366, versus 0.526 for aggregated yields.  The average 
correlation of the temperature effects across all districts was 0.72, and the average 
correlation of the residuals was 0.52.  
8 This procedure does not impose any distributional assumptions on the residuals but 
removes their central tendency (VB 2004). While OLS is inefficient when errors are not 
normally distributed, the econometric properties of an uninterrupted series independent 
variable as well as the level of skewness typical of corn yields can permit OLS to 
generate better crop yield coefficient estimates than many robust regression methods 
(Swinton and King 1991). 
9 The assumptions of BA are that the historical index time series is stationary, and 
statistically consistent with the prevailing climate during the contract period (i.e., the 
historical distribution of weather accurately reflects the true underlying distribution), and 
that the values are independent across different years (Jewson and Brix 2005).  
  24Regressing the temperature indexes on a linear trend suggested no significant warming or 
cooling trends in our data. 
10 We offer BA as a sufficient pricing method.  While a change in the contract price 
would uniformly shift the ex-post revenue of the buyer up or down, this would not affect 
the payment schedule and the correlation between losses and payoffs embedded in the 
contract structure (VB 2004). 
11 Most exchange traded swap contracts, such as those traded on the CME, are settled 
daily and are technically known as futures contracts.  Most OTC swap contracts are 
settled at the end of the contract and are known as forwards.  This study uses derivatives 
that are settled as forwards, and assumes that borrowing and lending exists at the risk-free 
rate.  It is unlikely that settlement method would change the qualitative results in a 
significant way. 
12 CME exchanged traded WDs do not exist for these specific locations, introducing 
additional geographic basis risk to the results.  Analysis of this basis risk may be a 
promising area of future research.   
13 The ES measure used here is based on the revenue distribution, and is thus a 
modification of the measure reported in Dowd and Blake 2006, which is calculated in 
terms of the loss distribution. 
14 The ES measure has also been referred to as the Conditional Tail Expectation, 
Expected Tail Loss, Tail VaR, Conditional VaR, Tail Conditional VaR, and Worst 
Conditional Expectation. Alternatively, ES can be interpreted as the utility of tail-risk for 
an agent with risk neutral tail-risk preferences. 
  2515 The choice of weighting scheme for the districts is not central to the findings. The 
analysis was also conducted using a production weighted average which as expected 
produced slightly stronger aggregation effects.   
16 Similar to previous research, the results are presented in terms of revenues assuming a 
constant price.  Thus, we do not address price risk, but rather restrict analysis to quantity 
risk only.  Evaluation of the price-quantity interaction effect, however, may be an 
interesting area of future research. 
17 In-sample estimates of two sub periods, 1971-1986 and 1987-2002, were highly 
consistent with the out-of-sample estimates.  For example, separate analysis of the in-
sample sub periods (not reported) revealed reductions in RMSL ranging from 3.88% 
(26.02%) in the 1
st half of the sample, to 42.59% (4.68%) for the 2
nd half for district D20 
(D80), whereas the State portfolio RMSL’s ranged only from 40.24% to 58.66%.   
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Table 1. Selected Weather Stations for 
  Illinois Crop Reporting Districts 
District City  County 
D10 Northwest  Dixon  Lee 
D20 Northeast  Ottawa  LaSalle 
D30 West  LaHarpe  Hancock 
D40 Central  Lincoln  Logan 
D50 East  Hoopeston  Vermillion 
D60 West Southwest  Whitehall  Greene 
D70 East Southeast  Olney  Richland 
D80 Southwest  Sparta  Randolph 






















  30aThe table presents results of the hedging analysis under the assumed objective of minimization of SV with an assumed constant price of 
$2.50/bu.  In-sample estimates were obtained by optimizing the objective with respect to the WD weight (WD weight and optimal strike) 
when hedging with swaps (options).  Statistics measuring changes in RMSL and ES are calculated relative to the unhedged revenue 
exposures.  “Average of Districts” column statistic values were obtained by averaging the individual district statistic values and is provided 
to serve as a basis of comparison to the “State (Aggregated)” results.  A decrease (increase) in the RMSL corresponds to a reduction 
(increase) in risk as a result of the addition of a WD.  In contrast, an increase (decrease) in the ES indicates a reduction (increase) in risk 
exposure from adding a WD. 
Table 2
a. Hedging Results of Historical Simulation, In-Sample Estimates, Full Sample, 1971-2002 
  District    
  D10 D20 D30 D40 D50 D60  D70 D80 D90  Average  of  State 
               Districts    (Aggregated) 
                 
Unhedged                 
Avg.  Yield  152.09 147.44 151.81 158.60 144.36 157.66  139.80  123.89  126.29  144.66  144.66 
RMSL  43.07 42.06 48.90 50.42 52.97 42.89  43.07  41.07  44.34  45.42  39.80 
ES  6%  240.56 237.91 224.41 235.23 201.04 251.92  227.55  192.83  181.88  221.48  235.38 
ES  9%  258.39 246.09 235.74 252.45 216.20 277.84  241.14  195.22  196.93  235.55  255.18 
                  
Hedged:  Swap                  
Weight                             
(contracts/acre,  $1  tick)  0.17 0.19 0.26 0.31 0.33 0.28  0.27  0.15  0.30  0.25  0.27 
Swap  Fair  Strike  644.26 803.91 798.75 851.04 804.03 907.38 1000.38 1092.37  994.53  877.40  877.40 
RMSL  36.62 35.78 39.71 35.94 33.94 28.33  34.25  36.36  29.35  34.47  27.11 
Change  RMSL  -6.45 -6.29 -9.19  -14.48  -19.04  -14.56  -8.82  -4.70 -14.99  -10.95  -12.69 
%  Change  RMSL  -14.97 -14.95 -18.80 -28.72 -35.94 -33.95  -20.48  -11.45  -33.80  -23.67  -31.88 
ES  6%  268.96 265.89 253.94 276.25 263.69 318.32  243.14  216.71  230.44  259.71  281.75 
ES  9%  281.75 268.19 273.14 292.36 270.04 326.55  258.27  222.80  234.68  269.75  284.68 
Change  ES  6%  28.41 27.98 29.53 41.03 62.65 66.40  15.58  23.88  48.57  38.23  46.37 
Change  ES  9%  23.36 22.10 37.40 39.91 53.85 48.72  17.13  27.59  37.75  34.20  29.49 
                  
Hedged:  Call  Option                  
WEIGHT  (contracts/Acre, 
$1 tick)  2.44 0.69 0.59 0.73 0.56 0.39  0.69  0.18  0.54  0.76  0.68 
Optimal  Call  Strike  864.96 875.89 876.00 920.78 819.00 929.68 1056.00  943.00 1014.00  922.15  953.48 
RMSL  28.15 34.54 37.08 32.74 32.00 30.05  32.94  35.40  25.82  32.08  22.56 
Change  RMSL  -14.91  -7.53 -11.82 -17.68 -20.98 -12.84  -10.13  -5.67  -18.52  -13.34  -17.23 
%  Change  RMSL  -34.63 -17.90 -24.17 -35.06 -39.59 -29.93  -23.51  -13.81  -41.76  -28.93  -43.31 
ES  6%  296.46 254.24 265.16 290.69 263.34 314.05  257.82  221.10  249.64  268.06  295.29 
ES  9%  304.80 273.51 274.00 306.76 271.39 319.75  264.94  227.23  253.43  277.31  302.31 
Change  ES  6%  55.90 16.33 40.75 55.46 62.30 62.13  30.26  28.28  67.76  46.57  59.91 
Change  ES  9%  46.41 27.42 38.26 54.31 55.19 41.91  23.80  32.01  56.51  41.76  47.13 















a. Hedging Results of Historical Simulation, 
Out-of-Sample Estimates, 1987-2002 
 Average  of  State 
Hedged: Call Option  Districts   (Aggregated) 
    
MRSL 25.56  19.65 
Change MRSL  -5.93  -6.78 
% Change MRSL  -16.85  -25.66 
ES 6%  268.41  291.85 
ES 9%  279.96  296.17 
aThe table presents out-of-sample estimates for the 
second half of the data period (1987-2002) when 
hedging with call options.  Out-of-sample estimates are 
obtained by applying the optimal hedge estimated from 



















































































1988: Drought 1995: Northern Illinois Heat Wave
1980: Illinois Drought 
Note: Yield data was obtained from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (1971-2002).  Temperature data was obtained from 
United States Climatology Network  
Figure 2. Illinois state corn yields (bu/acre)
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